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Abstract
This paper estimates the immediate impact of the European Central Bank’s asset purchase
programmes on sovereign bond spreads in the euro area between 2008 and 2015 using a
country-by-country GARCH model. The baseline estimates are rigorously diagnosed for
misspecification and subjected to a wide range of sensitivity tests. Among others, changes
in the dependent variable, the independent variables and the number of (G)ARCH terms
are tested. Moreover, the model is applied to subsamples and dynamic conditional cor-
relations are analyzed to estimate the effects of the asset purchases on the contagion of
spread movements. Generally, it is found that the asset purchase programmes triggered an
reduction of sovereign bond spreads. More specifically, the Securities Markets Programme
(SMP) had the most significant immediate effects on sovereign bond spreads across the
euro area. The announcements related to the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)
programme also yielded substantial spread compression in the periphery. In contrast to
that, the most recent Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) announced in January
2015 and implemented since March 2015 had no significant immediate effects on sovereign
bond spreads, except for Irish spreads. Hence, immediate effects seem to be dependent
upon the size of the programme, the extent to which it targets distressed sovereigns and
the way in which it is communicated.
Keywords: European Central Bank, asset purchase programmes, sovereign bond yield
spreads, event study, GARCH model
JEL classification: E52, E58, E44, G12
Table of Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 The ECB’s asset purchase programmes 5
3 Literature review 8
4 Methodology 10
4.1 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5 Empirical results 16
5.1 Baseline estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2 Baseline diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.3 Robustness tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6 Policy implications 25
7 Conclusion 27
References 29
3
1 Introduction
On January 22, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced a EUR 1.1 trillion sovereign
bond purchase programme in order to contain deflationary trends and restore increas-
ingly fragmented financial markets. This continues a series of asset purchase programmes
adopted by the ECB in recent years. Since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008,
spreads in euro area bond markets increased to an extent that had not been seen during
the era of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) so far (see Figure 1). These develop-
ments combined with the fact that interest rates had reached the zero lower bond relatively
soon after the start of the crisis, caused the ECB to use unconventional monetary policy
measures.
At the core of these measures were several asset purchase programmes. The Covered Bond
Purchase Programme (CBPP) was launched already in 2009, and was since reactivated
twice. The Securities Markets Programme (SMP) launched in 2010 aimed at purchasing
bonds from public and private bond markets and led to a balance sheet increase of the
ECB of more than EUR 200 billion. Finally, in 2012, the Outright Monetary Transactions
(OMT) programme was announced, which allows the ECB to buy an unlimited amount
of sovereign bonds in the secondary market. However, this instrument has so far not been
used. Interestingly enough, the announcement of the OMT alone is said to have been
effective in driving down bond spreads closer to pre-crisis levels (Wolf, 2014, p. 128).
Taken together, the main goal of these asset purchase programmes was the compression
of spreads in order to repair the dysfunctional monetary policy transmission mechanism
by removing market fragmentation (Coeure, 2013). Given the most recent announcement
by the ECB to purchase bonds worth at least EUR 1.1 trillion in the period between
March 2015 and September 2016, it is ever more important to assess the effects of the past
ECB programmes. Moreover, the literature on the functioning of unconventional mone-
tary policy measures is naturally relatively undeveloped. Therefore, this paper aims at
assessing the impact of the ECB’s asset purchase programmes on the change of sovereign
bond spreads.
In theory, the consumption-based asset pricing model developed by Cochrane (2001) im-
plies that the change of sovereign bond spreads is determined by three main components
(Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009). Firstly, the change of spreads over time is determined
by the change of differences between two countries’ quality of fundamentals such as abso-
lute and relative government debt, growth, interest rates and inflation (Poghosyan, 2014).
Secondly, the change of spreads critically depend on the evolution of differences in default
risk and liquidity risk between two countries. This means that if one of the two countries
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Figure 1: Daily 5-year sovereign bond spreads in core (left) and periphery (right) euro area
countries (2008-2015). Source: Own calculations, Thomson Reuters.
becomes relatively more risky than the other, spreads will increase.1 Finally, the impact
of changes in fundamental and risk differentials is amplified by general market uncertainty.
In theory, determinants of sovereign bond spreads include the differences of countries’
macroeconomic fundamentals, the differences in default and liquidity risk and general
market uncertainty (see Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009)). By using the instrument of
direct asset purchases, central banks can in principle influence all of these factors through
the monetary policy transmission mechanism. When announcing an asset purchase pro-
gramme clearly in advance, central banks can use the signalling channel to influence the
expectations of market participants about countries’ fundamentals and their risk. More-
over, a well-functioning portfolio balance channel will allow the central bank to directly
exert influence over countries’ fundamentals, such as the interest rates, and their relative
risk. Finally, the liquidity channel and the confidence channel enable the central bank to
influence liquidity risk and credit risk, respectively, while potentially calming markets (see
Hausken and Ncube (2013)).
Previous empirical literature has found that the ECB’s asset purchase programmes were
1This holds in case the spread is measured as the yield of the risiker country less the yield of the less
risky country, which is usually the case.
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successful in lowering sovereign bond spreads. Being targeted specifically at distressed pe-
riphery euro area sovereigns, the SMP had a large impact in terms of spread compression.
In this case, the effects exerted through the signalling channel (Szczerbowicz, 2014) were
arguably larger than the effects induced by the portfolio balance channel (Ghysels et al.,
2014). This is confirmed by the literature looking at both channels at the same time
(Fratzscher et al., 2014). Moreover, the OMT announcement including Mario Draghi’s
famous words “whatever it takes” also had significant immediate effects (Krishnamurthy
et al., 2014). For many, this case constitutes the best example of the effectiveness of the
signalling channel, if not for central banks as a whole.
This paper will contribute to the literature by assessing the immediate effect of the ECB’s
asset purchase programmes on the change of sovereign bond spreads in the euro area. For
this purpose, an event study approach will be used. Using a generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model, the change in sovereign bond spreads at
certain announcement dates will be scrutinized. This specification is deemed particu-
larly useful in the context of this paper as the observed volatility clustering in changes
of spreads can be modelled explicitly. Moreover, the effect of the purchases themselves
will be estimated. The dataset to be used includes daily data of 5-year sovereign bond
yields of 10 euro area countries and a series of dummy variables indicating certain types
of announcements by the ECB relating to asset purchases and data on purchase volumes.
Thereby, this paper is the first to analyze the most recent announcements of an extended
asset purchase programme by the ECB on 22 January and 9 March 2015.
The main result of this paper is that the ECB was able to lower sovereign bond spreads
significantly by way of its asset purchase programmes. In terms of announcement effects,
the SMP has been the most effective programme so far, lowering yields in the magnitude
of 27 to 188 basis points (bp) in the periphery.2 The immediate effect of the OMT an-
nouncement was smaller (35 to 40 bp), however, the weeks and months that followed saw a
strong convergence of sovereign bond yields across the board.3 Finally, the announcement
effect of the PSPP was neglible (except for Greece and Ireland), mostly due to the fact
that market participants anticipated the a large-scale bond purchasing programme long
before the announcement was made.
In order to assess the impact of the ECB’s asset purchases on sovereign bond spreads,
a description of the asset purchase programmes of the ECB since the beginning of the
financial crisis will be given first. Second, a short literature review of the empirical evidence
2The estimates ranged from -27 bp (Spain), -30 bp (Portugal), -35 bp (Italy) to -188 bp (Greece).
3Given the event studies approach of this paper, the conclusions are confined to immediate effects.
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for the ECB’s impact on sovereign bond spreads will be described. Finally, a unique
empirical assessment will be conducted and tested extensively for its robustness when
changing the assumptions of the underlying model.
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2 The ECB’s asset purchase programmes
Since 2009, the ECB has made regular use of large scale asset purchase programmes as
part of its non-standard monetary policy toolkit. On a fundamental level, there are two
different aims that were to be achieved by using large scale asset purchases. In most in-
stances, the asset purchase programmes of the ECB were directly targeting markets that
were essential for commerical banks’ funding. The drying up of certain markets was a
direct consequence of the financial crisis starting with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008. In other instances, the ECB used asset purchases to contain risks in the
euro area. Ultimately, these broad aims can more or less be proxied by one single bench-
mark: spread compression. As of April 2015, three different markets have been directly
targeted, including the covered bond market, the market for asset-backed securities and
the sovereign bond market.
The first market to be targeted was the covered bond market. In 2009, the first cov-
ered bond purchase programme (CBPP) was launched, followed by a second programme
(CBPP2) in 2011 and a third programme (CBPP3) in 2014. The covered bond market
constitutes an important source of funding for commerical banks and had been severely
affected by the financial crisis starting in 2008 (Trichet, 2009). Directly purchasing cov-
ered bonds was supposed to increase liquidity in this almost completely dried up market.
Also, the spread between covered bonds in the periphery and the core of the euro area was
intended to be decreased (ibid.). Most recently, on 4 September 2014, two asset purchase
programmes were announced (Draghi, 2014). The first was a continuation of the CBPP
as CBPP3. The second targeted the market for asset-backed securities (ABS). Within the
ABSPP, “senior and guaranteed mezzanine tranches of ABSs” were to be bought in both
primary and secondary markets (ibid.).
Looking at potential effects on the sovereign spreads, the programmes targeting the cov-
ered bond market or the market for asset-backed securities were not large when compared
to the sovereign bond market. At most, their effect on sovereign spreads could have been
indirect through portfolio balancing effects. However, given the degree of market uncer-
tainty and illiquidity in the respective markets in 2009 and 2011, there is a potential to
find impacts of the CBPP’s and the ABSPP on the change of sovereign spreads.
Next to asset purchase programmes mainly aiming at increasing the liquidity of commer-
cial banks, there was a second line of programmes adopted by the ECB targeted more
towards risk containment. In May 2010, the sovereign debt crisis was imminent. During
a weekend of hectic negotiations between the ECB, the European Commission and repre-
sentatives of the Member States, the ECB drew up a plan to purchase sovereign bonds in
secondary markets.
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In this context, the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) was announced on 10 May 2010,
together with other measures taken by euro area governments (ECB, 2010). The aim of
the SMP was to reduce market uncertainty in general, and more specifically, in terms of
perceived credit and liquidity risks. The ECB wanted ”to address the malfunctioning of
securities markets and restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism”
(ECB, 2010). In terms of implementation, therefore, this programme aimed specifically
at spread compression between peripheral and core euro area sovereign bonds.
The SMP was special in the sense that the purchases were conducted on a very discre-
tionary and ad-hoc basis according to daily market conditions. Thereby, the ECB had
wide-ranging discretion in order to reduce high spreads in the markets (Fratzscher et al.,
2014, p. 6). From a theoretical point of view, the SMP should have had a large influence
on sovereign bond spreads. It was targeted in particular at those sovereigns that were
highly risky in terms of both default risk and liquidity risk. Moreover, as there was no ex
ante limit on the amount of purchases, the SMP could be considered to be large enough
to move the market.
In mid-2012, the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area was more imminent than ever be-
fore. Speculations about a break-up of the euro area became more and more prominent.
On 26 July 2012, the newly appointed president of the ECB, Mario Draghi, announced
that the ECB was ready to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro (Draghi, 2012b).
This paved the way for the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)
programme on 6 September 2012 (Draghi, 2012a). Under this programme, the ECB can
purchase an unlimited amount of relatively short-term sovereign bonds.4 However, it al-
lows the ECB to purchase only sovereign bonds from those countries that are under an
EFSF or ESM adjustment programme (conditionality element).
The OMT was designed to contain default risk, or more specifically, the risk that one coun-
try will leave the euro area and adopt a national currency (ibid.).5 This risk is commonly
called redenomination risk. As of April 2015, no single purchase has been conducted under
the OMT and still, the programme is considered to have contained redenomination risk to
a large extent (Plickert, 2014). Thereby, Draghi’s announcement to do “whatever it takes”
to preserve the euro used the signalling channel to correct the expectation of the markets
that a redenomination of Greece, and potentially other periphery countries, was imminent.
4Short-term refers to a maturity of up to three years.
5“OMTs will enable us to address severe distortions in government bond markets which originate from,
in particular, unfounded fears on the part of investors of the reversibility of the [...] the euro is irreversible”
(Draghi, 2012b)
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Looking at the OMT’s theoretical effect on sovereign bond spreads, the OMT did indeed
have a strong potential to influence this measure. It targeted specifically the highly risky
sovereigns under the condition of participation in an adjustment programme. Moreover,
given the emphasis on the fact that purchases would be unlimited ex ante, the programme
was definitely large enough to move the sovereign bond market. However, the initial speech
by Mario Draghi did not contain any details to how the OMT would look like.6 In two
subsequent announcements, the ECB clarified the details of the OMT, some of which are
not even clear in 2015. Therefore, the announcement are not be expected to have had
strong immediate effects on spreads.
The most recent asset purchase programme of the ECB is by far the largest. On 22 Jan-
uary 2015 an extended asset purchase programme was officially announced containing a
broad public sector purchase programme (PSPP) and the previously launched ABSPP and
CBPP. The whole programme would have a target volume of EUR 60 billion per month
lasting at least until September 2016 for purchases of sovereign and supranational bonds
in the secondary market. In contrast to all previous programmes it was specified that
purchases were to be conducted by national central banks according to their shares in the
ECB’s capital key. This means that, for the first time, the ECB does not have discretion
to decide from which sovereign it wants to buy bonds. Hence, it is not to be expected that
the PSPP significantly lowers spreads. Instead, it might lower yields across all sovereigns
of the euro area.
Overall, when comparing the impact of the different asset purchase programmes, it is
expected that the SMP had the largest effects on sovereign bond spreads. As the OMT
was initially relatively vaguely defined, but large and targeted enough to move markets,
it is expected that the OMT did influence spreads between the periphery and the core
significantly. As it does not target risky sovereigns specifically, the PSPP is not expected
to have a significant impact on the spreads. Similarly, the CBPP’s and the ABSPP are
not expected to have influenced sovereign bond spreads.
6The announcement did not contain any details due its ad-hoc nature (Plickert, 2014).
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3 Literature review
This subsection will look at the empirical literature related to the impact of the ECB’s
asset purchase programmes on sovereign bond spreads. Generally, the literature finds that
the effects are limited to the periphery countries: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and
Italy. On average, the SMP had the largest impact in terms of spread compression with
large variations between the periphery countries. While the OMT announcement has had
a more limited immediate effect on sovereign bond spreads, the CBPP’s showed no sig-
nificant influence. Thereby, these findings confirm the expectations about the impact of
the different asset purchase programmes. The most recent ABSPP/CBPP3 as well as the
PSPP have not yet been covered by the literature.
The amount of literature on the effects of the asset purchase programmes on sovereign bond
spreads is very limited. Szczerbowicz (2014) and Falagiarda and Reitz (2015) both employ
an event study framework to look at the impact of major asset purchase announcements
on spreads. With regard to the SMP, Greek spreads saw the largest decrease, between
170 and 485 bp. However, both studies acknowledge that their estimates of the impact on
Greek spreads are unstable. The announcement impact on Irish and Portuguese spreads
was also considerable with a reduction of between 78 and 121 bp for Ireland and between
54 and 102 bp for Portugal. Finally, the studies find a reduction in Spanish spreads of
between 59 to 81 bp and for Italian spreads between 31 and 70 bp.
Instead of looking at the impact of the SMP on sovereign bond spreads, the largest part of
the empirical literature assesses the impact on yields. While Kilponen et al. (2012), Eser
et al. (2013) and Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) look at the impact of the ECB’s announce-
ments only, Ghysels et al. (2014) looks at the impact of the actual purchases. Fratzscher
et al. (2014) look at both announcement and operational effects within the same method-
ological framework.
Due to the SMP announcements, yields decreased mostly in Portugal (-228 bp), Ireland
(-176 bp), Spain (-149 bp) and Italy (-123 bp), according to Krishnamurthy et al. (2014).
Fratzscher et al. (2014) confirm the finding for Italy and Spain with a combined impact
of -121 bp. The operational effects were significantly smaller: Italian and Spanish yields
decreased by 70 bp (ibid.), whereas Irish yields decreased by 21 bp and Portuguese yields
decreased by 20 bp (Ghysels et al., 2014). The finding that operational effects are generally
smaller than announcement effects could either stem from the strength of the signalling
channel or from methodological issues (i.e. endogeneity of daily asset purchases). On
a different note, De Pooter et al. (2014) find that the SMP announcements significantly
decreased sovereign liquidity risk premia in magnitude of 23 bp for each percent of debt
outstanding purchased.
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According to the literature of the effects of the ECB’s asset purchases on spreads, the
immediate announcement effects of the OMT were more subdued than those of the SMP.
Szczerbowicz (2014) finds the largest impact on spreads for Spanish (-59 bp) and Por-
tuguese (-54 bp) spreads. For Italy, she finds a reduction of 31 bp as a response to the
OMT announcements. In terms of yields, Fratzscher et al. (2014) find a reduction for
Italian and Spanish bonds of 70 bp, whereas Altavilla et al. (2014) find a reduction of up
to 200 bp using high frequency data. Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) find reductions of -129
bp (Spain), -118 bp (Portugal) and -83 bp (Italy). However, these values are considerably
smaller than the effects these studies find for the SMP.
Generally, there are several methodological deficiences in the empirical literature. Most
importantly, there is a lack of robustness testing when modelling sovereign bond yields
and spreads. In what follows, this paper will therefore present a unique empirical as-
sessment of the ECB’s asset purchase programmes combining different elements from the
previous empirical literature. It will look at the impact on sovereign bond spreads em-
ploying an event study framework following the recent popularity of this approach (see,
for instance, Szczerbowicz (2014), Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) and Hausken and Ncube
(2013)). Thereby, a GARCH specification for modelling daily changes in sovereign bond
spreads similar to Falagiarda and Reitz (2013) will be used. In order to tackle a familiar
problem when taking into account operational effects, the endogeneity contained in daily
SMP purchases will be eliminated following the metholodogy proposed by Fratzscher et al.
(2014).
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4 Methodology
4.1 Model
The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of the ECB’s asset purchases on sovereign
bond spreads. Due to the I(1) character of the time series of bond spreads, changes in
spreads will be modelled. With regard to the event window, there is a trade-off that is
common in the related literature. The smaller the event window (i.e. the time period
over which the change is calculated), the less of the effect of monetary policy is captured.
However, the larger the window, the less precise, or the more noisy, the estimate will be
(see also Hausken and Ncube (2013, p. 25)). This paper will use the two-day change
in sovereign bond spreads as the dependent variable that is to be modelled. The choice
represents a compromise often used in the relevant empirical literature.7
The type of model that is most appropriate for the statistical properties of the time series
of changes of spreads is the GARCH model originally developed by Bollerslev (1987).8 The
GARCH model assumes that the residuals are conditionally homoskedastic and uncondi-
tionally heteroskedastic. In addition to a specification for the mean, the GARCH model
allows to model the variance of the time series explicitly. It can also account for volatility
clustering, as the variance is modelled as a function of its past values and past distur-
bances. Therefore, the baseline specification for modelling two-day changes in sovereign
bond spreads is a GARCH specification.
∆si,t = αi + βiANt + φiOPi,t + ρ∆si,t−1 + γiXi,t + i,t (1)
Equation 1 allows for an estimation of the immediate effects of asset purchase announce-
ments and implementations. It models the mean of the two-day change in sovereign bond
spreads, represented by ∆s in time t for each country i. The control vector X contains the
most important determinants of the change of sovereign bond spreads (see Manganelli and
7See, for example, Szczerbowicz (2014), Falagiarda and Reitz (2013), Hausken and Ncube (2013) and
Joyce et al. (2011).
8The time series of the change in spreads is stationary, and thus the unconditional mean is constant, i.e.
the conditional mean is zero. Moreover, the positive autocorrelation in changes in spreads justifies the use
of one lag of the dependent variable when modelling the mean. Furthermore, the positive autocorrelation
in the variance of changes of spreads justifies the explicit modelling of the variance of change of spreads.
Also, the volatility clustering means that the variance should be a function of past disturbances. Finally,
the positive autocorrelation up until a very high lag order suggests that the variance should also be a
function of its own lags.
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Wolswijk (2009)).This includes macroeconomic fundamentals, general market uncertainty,
credit risk and liquidity risk. Moreover, other possibly important factors for the change
in sovereign bond spreads have been added. This includes inflationary expectations (a
more specific element of macroeconomic fundamentals), redenomination risk (a specific
form of credit risk that was particularly important in the euro area sovereign debt crisis)
and equity market returns. Seasonal effects are eliminated by including dummy variables
for each weekday (Falagiarda and Gregori, 2015, p. 10).9
The central bank is assumed to affect the change of sovereign bond spreads through an-
nouncements of asset purchases, represented by the vector AN10 and through the pur-
chases of assets itself, OP 11. The vector AN contains the “impulse dummies” listed in
Table 1 (Fratzscher et al., 2014). However, the dummies relating to the CBPP and the
ABSPP are left out from the baseline specification as these programmes did not target
sovereign debt markets directly. Accordingly, the vector OP contains the following vari-
ables: OP SMPi,t and OP PSPPi,t.
12 Incorporating both of these types of variables
within a single equation has first been advocated by Fratzscher et al. (2014) and Ghysels
et al. (2014).
On a fundamental level, the GARCH model allows the error term to be zero mean and its
variance to be unconditionally heteroskedastic.
i,t ∼ N(0, σ2i,t) (2)
The variance itself is modelled as an ARMA process. In the baseline model, one AR
component and one MA component are included. This specification is usually referred to
as GARCH(1,1) and represents the simplest GARCH specification.13
σ2i,t = ωi + ηi
2
i,t−1 + piiσ
2
i,t−1 (3)
9In the baseline specification, the control vector X contains: ∆CESIt, ∆FS5y5yt, ∆V STOXXt,
∆CDSi,t, ∆QCDSsi,t, ∆BAi,t and ∆Emkti,t. The variables are explained in the data section.
10This variable represents the signalling channel.
11This variable represents the portfolio balance channel.
12Note that both the operational variable of the SMP and the PSPP contain per-country data as signified
by the subscript i.
13σi,t is the conditional variance of , ηi is the ARCH coefficient and pii is the GARCH coefficient.
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Equations 1 and 3 thus describe the complete empirical specification to be used as a
baseline specification in this paper. The estimates from the GARCH model are obtained
via maximum likelihood estimation using the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS)
and the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) algorithms. The model is estimated for each
sample country separately in order to analyze heterogeneity across countries.
4.2 Data
The dataset used for this paper contains daily data covering the period from January 1,
2008 to April 13, 2015. It is comprised of data on 10 euro area countries, each categorized
either as core or as periphery country.14 Daily data for 5-year sovereign bond yields15
was collected from Datastream and originates from Thomson Reuters. Subsequently, the
5-year sovereign bond yields have been transformed into 5-year sovereign bond spreads
with respect to German sovereign bond yields. The eventual dependent variable was then
obtained by taking the two-day change of 5-year sovereign bond spreads.16
The key announcement dates of the ECB’s policies as listed in Table 1 were taken from
the relevant literature (Krishnamurthy et al. (2014), Szczerbowicz (2014) and Fratzscher
et al. (2014)). The significance of the selected dates was double-checked by looking up the
exact content of the announcement on the ECB’s website. Subsequently, each announce-
ment was transformed into an impulse dummy variable equal to one on the date of the
announcement and zero otherwise.
The data concerning the volume of the ECB’s asset purchases was obtained from the
ECB’s website.17 However, parts of the data on the ECB’s purchases is only available on
a weekly basis. As it is crucial for the analysis in this paper to be based on daily data, the
weekly data has been interpolated by assuming that the purchase volume during a week
was equally distributed over the five weekdays. Thereby, this paper follows Fratzscher
et al. (2014). Another data-related issue is the endogeneity of daily SMP purchases with
respect to sovereign bond yields and spreads. As Fratzscher et al. (2014) argue, this stems
14Core countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany. Periphery countries: Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal, Spain.
15The 5-year maturity has been chosen because it is in the middle between the 2-year and 10-year
maturity bonds that were targeted by the ECB (Eser et al., 2013, p. 10).
16In the baseline specification, a two-day change refers to the change between the closing price at t− 2
and the closing price at t. Different definitions will be applied in the section on robustness tests.
17More specifically, the data originates from the website’s section on liquidity analysis as well as the
numbers on the “securities held for monetary policy purposes” from the weekly financial statements.
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Date Programme Impulse Dummy Description
07 May 2009 CBPP1 an cbppi 1 The Governing Council of the ECB announces its
decision to purchase covered bonds.
04 June 2009 CBPP1 an cbppi 2 The ECB publishes detailed modalities for the
CBPP1, including information on volume and el-
igibility.
10 May 2010 SMP an smp 1 The Governing Council announces the SMP as
part of a package with other measures to address
increased tensions of euro area financial markets.
07 August 2011 SMP an smp 2 Draghi announces the reactivation of the SMP,
targeting Italian and Spanish bonds in particular.
06 October 2011 CBPP2 an cbppii 1 The Governing Council announces the launch
of the CBPP2, including details on volume and
length.
03 November 2011 CBPP2 an cbppii 2 The ECB announces detailed modalities for the
CBPP2.
26 July 2012 OMT an omt 1 Draghi announces that the ECB is ”ready to do
whatever it takes to preserve the euro”.
02 August 2012 OMT an omt 2 The Governing Council announces its considera-
tion of outright open market operations.
06 September 2012 OMT an omt 3 The Governing Council announces the OMT pro-
gramme, including detailed modalities.
04 September 2014 ABSPP / CBPP3 an abspp 1 The Governing Council announces its decision to
launch the ABSPP and the CBPP3.
02 October 2014 ABSPP / CBPP3 an abspp 2 The ECB publishes detailed modalities for the
ABSPP and the CBPP3.
22 January 2015 PSPP an pspp 1 The Governing Council announces an expanded
asset purchase programme, encompassing the
new PSPP as well as the formerly launched AB-
SPP and the CBPP3.
09 March 2015 PSPP an pspp 2 The PSPP is implemented.
Table 1: Overview of the ECB’s asset purchase programme announcements.
from the fact that the ECB conducted its purchases according to prevailing market condi-
tions. This issue has been tackled by modelling an SMP-specific reaction function of the
ECB following the approach of Fratzscher et al. (2014).
In order to control for countries’ macroeconomics fundamentals at a daily frequency, the
Citigroup Economic Surprise Indicator (CESI) for the euro area is used as a control vari-
able. It measures the surprise content of the release of macroeconomic news. A positive
value indicates that economic news have come as a positive surprise, whereas a negative
value points to news that did not meet market expectations (Mackintosh, 2011). The data
comes from Citigroup and has been obtained through Datastream. A positive change in
the CESI is expected to be related to a negative change of sovereign spreads. Thus, the
coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative.
A particularly important macroeconomic fundamental is inflation and, more specifically,
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inflationary expectations. Shocks to inflationary expectations could potentially affect the
change of sovereign bond spreads (Cantor and Packer, 1996). The ECB and thus the mar-
ket commonly uses the 5-year-5-year forward interest swap rate as a proxy for medium-term
inflationary expectations (Blackstone, 2014). Thus, this paper will utilize this measure in
the baseline specification. The data has been obtained through Datastream and originates
from Thomson Reuters. A positive change in inflationary expectations is expected to be
related to a negative change of sovereign spreads.18 Thus, the coefficient of this variable
is expected to be negative.
A country’s default risk is proxied by its credit default swap (CDS) premium (see, for in-
stance, Aizenman et al. (2013)). In this case, the 5-year CDS premia have been chosen as
the appropriate variable, as it corresponds to the maturity of the sovereign bond spreads
used as a dependent variable.19 This data has also been obtained from Datastream. As
argued in section two, a higher default risk is supposed to increase spreads. Thus, a posi-
tive coefficient for this variable is expected.
As described above, a form of default risk that was very important during the euro
sovereign debt crisis is redenomination risk. In the context of the euro area, this risk
describes “the risk that a euro asset will be redenominated into a devalued legacy cur-
rency” (De Santis, 2015, p. 1). It stands for the fears of a breakup of the euro area and
has arguably been a major driver in the spreads that caused Draghi to assert that the
ECB would do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro (Draghi, 2012b). According to
De Santis (2015, p. 35), redenomination risk can be computed with the help of quanto
CDS premia. The latter is the difference between a CDS denominated in US Dollar and
the analogue CDS denominated in EUR. Taking the difference between a country’s quanto
CDS and the benchmark quanto CDS20 yields the measure for redenomination risk. A
higher redenomination risk should theoretically increase sovereign bond spreads. Thus,
this variable is expected to have a positive coefficient.
Another potentially important control variable is the development of equity markets, as eq-
uities constitute, to a certain extent, an alternative to bonds (Falagiarda and Reitz, 2015).
Therefore, equity market indices for each country in the sample have been obtained from
Datastream. Further possible controls include dummy variables for other important policy
18This expectation stems from the fact that, if there is an increase in expected inflation, this is seen to
come mainly from periphery countries.
19Moreover, the CDS premia used here are those denominated in US Dollar, as the market for euro area
CDS in USD is substantitally more liquid than the market for euro area CDS in euro (De Santis, 2015, p.
8).
20Again, Germany is chosen as a benchmark.
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announcements from the US Federal Reserve and those related to the European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Moreover, con-
trol vector X also contains weekday dummies in order to eliminate seasonal effects and
a dummy variable equal to one during the euro sovereign debt crisis and zero elsewhere
(following Falagiarda and Reitz (2015)).
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5 Empirical results
This section will present the results of estimating the baseline specification. Subsequently,
the validity of the assumptions underlying the baseline model will be tested.
5.1 Baseline estimates
The results of the estimation of the baseline specification are reported in Table 2. In
line with the empirical literature, the SMP is identified as the asset purchase programme
with the largest impact on sovereign bond spreads in the euro area. The strongest impact
was achieved by the announcement on 7 August 2011 to reactivate the SMP programme
by purchasing Italian and Spanish bonds. Indeed, their spreads were reduced by 35 and
27 bp, respectively. Greek spreads were reduced by 48 and Portuguese spreads by 30
bp.21 These estimates are smaller than the average estimates from previous empirical
studies. Moreover, this announcement had an impact beyond peripheral spreads, with
spread compression in Belgium (-11 bp), Finland (-10 bp) and Austria (-7 bp).22 The
initial announcement of the SMP on 10 May 2010 affected only Greek spreads, but with
a larger magnitude of -140 bp.23 In terms of operational effects, the estimation did not
yield significant impacts for the SMP.24
According to the baseline estimates and again in line with the empirical literature, the
OMT did not immediately impact spreads as much as the SMP did. However, the effects
of the OMT were still sizeable. For the Italian spread, a 41 bp reduction was estimated
for all OMT-related announcements taken together, while the estimate for Ireland (-35
bp) is only weakly significant. Again, Greek spreads behaved very differently from those
of the rest of the euro area. In fact, the OMT announcement increased Greek spreads by
42 to 73 bp.25 This points to the inherent weakness of the event study framework. The
effect of the OMT announcement did not abruptly translate into lower spreads, but did so
only over weeks and months. These lagged effects arguably were due to the vagueness of
the announcements and cannot be captured with the event study framework used in this
paper.
21The coefficient for Portugal is only weakly significant. Whenever significance is referred to as “weak”,
a significance at the 10% level is meant.
22The coefficient for Austria is only weakly significant.
23Again, this result is only weakly statistically significant.
24Somewhat counterintuitively, the implementation of the SMP was estimated to have increased Greek
spreads by 8 bp.
25The latter estimate incorporates the coefficient for the first OMT announcement and the weakly
significant coefficient for the third OMT announcement.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IE BL EL BL PT BL ES BL IT BL AT BL BE BL FI BL FR BL
Sov. Spread, 1st diff.
AN SMP 1 -1.204 -1.404∗ -0.359 -0.261 -0.182 0.058 -0.097 -0.071 0.021
AN SMP 2 -0.106 -0.479∗∗∗ -0.298∗ -0.267∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ -0.071∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ 0.064
AN OMT 1 0.141 0.421∗∗∗ 0.232 -0.314 -0.409∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.042 -0.044 -0.017
AN OMT 2 -0.014 0.192 -0.276 0.044 -0.136 0.042 -0.045 -0.019 0.029
AN OMT 3 -0.348∗ 0.309∗ 0.058 0.119 -0.013 -0.068 -0.068∗ -0.064 -0.061
AN PSP 1 -0.004 0.301∗∗ 0.010 -0.041 -0.031 -0.022 -0.059 -0.024 -0.008
AN PSP 2 0.053 -0.012 0.038 0.016 0.036 -0.010 -0.002 -0.035 0.028
OP SMP 0.024 0.081∗ 0.050 -0.010 -0.023
OP PSPP -0.997∗ -0.010 0.065 -0.031 -0.005 -0.164 0.048 -0.015
CESI -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000
Forward swap 5y5y -0.215∗∗∗ -0.042 -0.072∗∗ -0.047∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗ 0.004 -0.020
VSTOXX 0.002∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ -0.000 0.001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.001
CDS 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
QCDS spread -0.004∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001 -0.001∗
Bid-ask spread 0.126 -0.952∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.197 0.237 0.046 -0.099 0.203 -0.036
Equity market -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000∗
Constant -0.011∗∗ 0.001 -0.011∗∗ -0.006 -0.007∗ -0.001 -0.003∗ -0.002 -0.003∗
ARMA
L.ar 0.473∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗
ARCH
L.arch 0.216∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
L.garch 0.822∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗
Constant 0.000∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Observations 1678 1879 1849 1735 1879 1534 1879 1824 1735
AIC -2773.019 -1180.110 -2385.387 -3963.977 -4572.197 -5796.023 -6435.465 -7572.010 -6684.061
BIC -2631.960 -1041.648 -2241.805 -3822.049 -4428.196 -5662.632 -6297.003 -7439.799 -6547.592
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2: Results of the estimation of the baseline specification. Dependent variables: Two-day change of sovereign bond spreads.
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In line with the expectations described above, the baseline estimates for the impact of the
most recently announced PSPP are mostly insignificant. Again, Greece is an exception.
The announcement of the PSPP lead to a 30 bp increase of spreads. This might stem
from the fact that Greek bonds are not included in the PSPP, while the bonds of all other
sovereigns in the sample are included. Due to the actual purchase of assets, Irish spreads
have contracted by -100 bp since the start of the PSPP purchases on 9 March 2015.26 The
finding that the PSPP did not have an impact on other spreads possibly comes from the
fact that the PSPP purchases are conducted very broadly, in line with the ECB’s capital
key. That implies that, in contrast to the SMP, bonds from all countries in the sample are
bought. Hence, instead of immediate spread compression an immediate reduction in bond
yields can be expected from the implementation of the PSPP. Beyond immediate effects
the PSPP could however very well have second-order effects on sovereign bond spreads
due to investors’ search for yield.
The controlling components of the baseline model are largely appropriate. The AR co-
efficient in the mean equation is highly significant in all countries. Thereby, this term
partially eliminates the serial correlation in the dependent variable. Moreover, the ARCH
and GARCH terms are both highly significant in all countries. Throughout, the sum of
the two is close to one, indicating that the variance of two-day changes in spreads is a long
memory process.27 More broadly, this also confirms the choice of a GARCH model as the
baseline specification for modelling the two-day change in sovereign bond spreads.
Furthermore, the coefficients of the control variables mostly have the expected signs. The
negative coefficients for the CESI in most countries confirm that better-than-expected
macroeconomic fundamentals decrease sovereign bond spreads. The positive coefficients
for the VSTOXX in all countries show that indeed higher market uncertainty leads to
higher sovereign bond spreads. Looking at the influence of default risk, the positive
coefficients for the CDS premia in almost all countries confirm that higher default risk
implies a higher spread. The mostly insignificant coefficients related to the bid-ask spreads,
however, do not confirm the theoretical impact of liquidity risk on sovereign bond spreads.
Either liquidity risk was not a determining factor for sovereign bond spreads in the sample
period, or there is a measurement problem as the bid-ask spread does not capture liquidity
risk in its entirety.28 Also, the coefficients for the quanto CDS spreads are mostly negative,
which is not in line with the empirical findings of De Santis (2015).
26This coefficient is only weakly significant.
27This would require another robustness test involving long-memory models such as IGARCH or FI-
GARCH.
28Note that the bid-ask spread is only one proxy for liquidity. There are more indicators, for which data
was not available.
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5.2 Baseline diagnostics
This subsection will gauge the degree to which the baseline specifictation is an appropriate
representation of the realized change in sovereign bond spreads. This will give an indica-
tion of how reliable the results from the baseline estimation are. For this purpose, the fit of
the model will firstly be assessed graphically. Secondly, it will be checked both graphically
and quantiatively whether or not there is serial correlation in the fitted residuals. Thirdly,
it will be tested for residual ARCH effects contained in the fitted variance of residuals.
Finally, it will be checked whether the distribution of the fitted residuals is in line with
the assumed distribution in the baseline specification.
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Figure 2: Fit of the baseline specification. The top panels show the fitted and realized values
for the whole sample (in percentage points) in Ireland (left) and Spain (right). The bottom
panels show the fitted and realized values around the second SMP announcement in Ireland (left)
and Spain (right).
Regarding the in-sample fit, as shown in Figure 2, the baseline model fits the realized
changes in sovereign bond spreads quite well. The SMP announcement effect, shown in
Figure 2, is well captured by the baseline model. Hence, from this rough graphical analy-
sis, the model indeed seems to be a good representation of real-world changes of sovereign
bond spreads including the effect of the ECB’s announcement of an asset purchase pro-
gramme.
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Furthermore, in order for the model to be correctly specified, it should have eliminated
serial correlation in the standardized fitted residuals (Bollerslev, 1987). The ACFs and
PACFs did not confirm this. In fact, serial correlation is present in all time series except
the one for Greece. In particular, the combination of the autocorrelation functions and the
partial autocorrelation functions reveal a moving average (MA) signature.29 As a result,
the baseline model seems to be somewhat misspecified in this respect.
Turning to another indicator for misspecification, the model was checked for residual
ARCH effects in the squared standardized residuals (ibid.). As shown in Figure ??, the
result is mixed in this respect. In some of the estimated variances (such as Ireland, Greece
and Italy), there seem to be residual ARCH effects pointing at a lack of ARCH/GARCH
terms in the baseline specification. In theory, this could be circumvented by increasing the
number of ARCH/GARCH terms. However, this presents a trade-off between estimation
precision and misspecification. Still, the model seems to be misspecified for some countries
in terms of residual ARCH effects.
Finally, it was checked whether the assumption that the standardized residuals that were
fitted with the baseline specification indeed follow a Student’s t distribution with the ap-
propriate degrees of freedom.30 As shown in Figure ?? and Table ??, the t-distribution
seems to be an appropriate assumption in all cases except for Greece and Spain. There-
fore, the model seems to be largely correctly specified in terms of distributional match.
Having presented the results of the baseline estimation and having pointed out the defi-
ciencies of the model in representing realized changes in sovereign bond spreads, the next
section will stress test the baseline specification. Changing the various assumptions of the
underlying baseline model will allow for a thorough assessment of the reliability of the
baseline estimates.
5.3 Robustness tests
In order to assess the sensitivity of the empirical results to changes in the underlying
assumptions, seven different types of robustness tests were conducted. Besides changes in
the dependent variable, in the variables of interest and the control variables in both the
mean and the variance equation, the estimation strategy has been changed. Moreover, a
29This stems from the fact that the autocorrelation functions cut off after one, two or three lags and the
partial autocorrelation functions decay over time.
30Note that there was no ex ante assumption about the degrees of freedom of the Student’s t distribution.
Instead, the degrees of freedom were estimated along with the parameters of the model.
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subsample analysis has been conducted and dynamic conditional correlations have been
analyzed. The latter is useful to assess potential effects on the contagion between euro
area sovereign spreads.
Firstly, the dependent variable has been changed from two-day changes in sovereign bond
spreads to one-day changes.31 This change of assumptions renders the impact of the asset
purchases insignificant. However, the estimates with respect to the control variables re-
main very stable. From this, it could be inferred that the very immediate effects of asset
purchase programmes are small and insignificant compared to other drivers of sovereign
spreads. Less significant estimates are obtained also when changing the definition of the
dependent variable to capture some of the anticipatory effects of the announcements (Fala-
giarda and Reitz, 2013). Overall, however, the magnitudes are similar.
Secondly, announcement and implementation variables of the CBPP and the ABSPP have
been added to the baseline specification. All variables related to the CBPP and the AB-
SPP do not yield significant effects on changes in sovereign bond spreads. The estimates
for the other programmes change if at all only marginally.
Following Szczerbowicz (2014), another sensitivity test includes three further control vari-
ables to the baseline specification: a dummy for important QE-related announcements of
the US Federal Reserve, a dummy for important announcements relating to the EFSF
and the ESM and a dummy for acute periods of sovereign debt crisis in the euro area.
When including the new control variables, the estimates do not change at all compared
to the baseline estimates. Also, the newly included control variables are, at best, weakly
significant.
A reason for the residual ARCH effects in some of the fitted standardized residuals could be
the lack of explanatory variables in the baseline equation for the variance. Two variables
that could potentially have a direct impact on the variance of changes in spreads could be
market uncertainty and redenomination risk. However, when including the VSTOXX and
the quanto CDS spreads in the variance equation, the estimates from the baseline model
do not change significantly.
The baseline diagnostics have also pointed to the deficiency of the baseline model of not
entirely capturing ARCH effects in the squared standardized residuals. Thus, it is sensible
to include additional ARCH and GARCH terms into the baseline specification. By chang-
ing this, some of the estimates indeed deviate substantially from the baseline estimates.
31In this specification, the changes of the control variables was also reduced from two-day to one-day.
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The highly significant impact of the SMP on Spanish spreads (-27 bp) found with the
baseline specification turns insignificant and halves in magnitude when including an addi-
tional ARCH term. However, Irish and Belgian coefficients do not deviate substantially.
Furthermore, a GJR-GARCH specification was tested. The magnitude of the coefficients
is largely the same, but their significance is higher across variables and countries. Thus,
even when taking into account asymmetries in the distribution, the estimates do not differ
from the baseline estimates.
Another sensitivity test to be used in order to test the robustness of the baseline estimates
is subsample analysis. It could be argued that market conditions between the three main
sovereign bond market targeting programmes SMP, OMT and PSPP were fundamentally
different and thus requires separate estimations. For this purpose, the sample was divided
into three: a period of the start of the euro area sovereign debt crisis including the SMP
(January 2008 until June 2012), a period of heightened market tensions that gradually de-
creased, including the OMT announcements (July 2012 until February 2013) and, finally,
a period of a relatively calm sovereign debt market with increasingly lower inflationary
expectations leading up to the PSPP (March 2013 until April 2015).
When estimating the baseline specifiation for the three subsamples, the impact of the
asset purchase programmes generally increases to some extent. This deviation from the
whole sample estimates is particularly strong for the SMP. The impact of the second SMP
announcement on the Spanish spread increases from -27 bp to -48 bp. Moreover, the
impact of the first SMP announcement on Spanish spreads also increases from -26 bp to
-37 bp and becomes highly significant. The corresponding estimate for the Belgian spread
increases from -11 bp to -14 bp.
There is a similar effect for the OMT when looking at the results of the subsample analysis.
Compared to the baseline estimate, the impact of the OMT on Irish spreads increases in
absolute terms by 4 bp to -38 bp. The other coefficents for the OMT remain unchanged.
The estimates for the PSPP change somewhat with Belgian spreads now showing a re-
action of -6 bp to the first PSPP announcement on 22 January 2015. The large effect
of the PSPP purchases on Irish spreads turn from weakly significant to insignificant. On
another note, as expected from the hypothesis of differing market conditions between the
subsamples, the coefficients for some of the control variables vary considerably across sub-
sample periods. The impact of inflationary expectations on Irish spreads, for instance,
varies between -15 bp in the first subsample, -88 bp in the second subsample and -22 bp
in the third subsample.
Viewed from a different perspective, in the particular crisis situation that led to the adop-
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tion of the SMP and the OMT programmes it was not only important for the ECB to have
an effect on the spreads themselves, but also on the correlations of spreads between euro
area sovereigns. The correlation of spreads is an indicator for contagion. Following the
approach of Missio and Watzka (2011), a Dynamic Conditional Correlations (DCC) model
was estimated. The variances were subsequently standardized to obtain correlations. In
many cases, the correlations show a downward trend after the second announcement re-
lated to the SMP on 7 August 2011, as shown in Figures 3. This is especially the case
for Greek and Portuguese spreads. Thus, the SMP did not only reduce spreads, but also
limited contagion between distressed euro area sovereigns.
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Figure 3: Dynamic conditional correlations of Spanish spreads with spreads from other
periphery euro area sovereigns. The vertical lines represent the asset purchase announcements
(SMP1, SMP2, OMT1, OMT3, PSPP1, PSPP2).
Overall, the only change of assumptions that made a substantial difference to the baseline
estimates was the inclusion of an additional ARCH term. However, the baseline model
as a whole is still superior to a specification with more than one ARCH term. This has
been tested by looking at various ARCH/GARCH specifications to explain the change in
sovereign bond spreads. Also, the deviation when including an additional ARCH term is
less pronounced in countries other than Spain. All in all, the sensitivity tests described in
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this section show the high degree of robustness of the baseline estimates. In other words,
the fact that the relaxation of all the different assumptions underlying the baseline do not
substantially change the estimates, makes the baseline estimates particularly reliable.
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6 Policy implications
What can euro area central bankers learn from this? Based on the results of this paper, an
asset purchase programme intended to reduce sovereign bond market fragmentation in the
short run has maximum impact if the ECB optimizes across the following three dimensions.
Firstly, the allocation of sovereign bond purchases should be based on three kinds of risks:
default risk, redenomination risk and liquidity risk. This paper has supported the view
of the theoretical literature that the size of sovereign bond spreads is determined by dif-
ferences in default risk, redenomination risk and liquidity risk across countries. Hence,
there is a justification for purchasing the bonds of those sovereigns with the largest risks
in these three dimensions. These sovereigns should be targeted first and with most of the
available firepower to achieve maximum immediate spread compression. The purchases of
the ECB would thereby signal to investors that the events of default, redenomination and
illiquidity in the concerned countries are more unlikely than before. As this information
is priced in by investors, sovereign bond spreads will contract.
Secondly, the size of the asset purchase programme needs to be sufficient to move markets.
The SMP contained no ex ante limit. It worked well in terms of spread compression be-
cause markets knew that the pockets of the ECB were deep enough to ultimately achieve
a reduction of market fragmentation. When announcing the OMT programme, the ECB
explicitly mentioned that purchases would be of unlimited size. The emphasis on the po-
tential magnitude of the programme was an important factor for its effectiveness in moving
the sovereign bond market. In contrast, the case of the CBPPs shows that programmes
that are small relative to the market do not result in significant immediate spread compres-
sion.32 Finally, the PSPP announcement in January 2015 surprised market participants
as the amount of purchases was larger than what was commonly expected. This fact alone
was likely to trigger portfolio rebalancing.33 Hence, the ECB could either announce no
target with respect to programme size, relying on its theoretically unlimited potential to
purchase bonds. Or alternatively, the ECB could observe market expectations and an-
nounce a size that is above those expectations.
Thirdly, a clear communication of which assets are to be purchased facilitates a more
pronounced immediate impact. If the primary target of an asset purchase programme is
immediate spread reduction, the ECB would act optimally if the sovereign bonds to be
purchased are announced explicity ex ante. The bonds of these sovereigns would then be
32Although in this case the programme was aimed at targeting the covered bond market, for which it
was relatively large.
33This effect was limited by the fact that distressed sovereigns were not explicitly targeted.
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the most likely to have their spreads reduced. This was done to a certain extent when
announcing the SMP. However, in practice an asset purchase programme will most likely
not exclusively aim at reducing sovereign bond spreads. In these cases, it might often be
optimal to leave unclear which sovereigns will be targeted to what extent.
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7 Conclusion
This paper confirmed and strengthened previous findings that the ECB’s asset purchase
programmes generally lowered sovereign bond spreads. A closer look into the differences
across programmes yields substantially differing results. The SMP had the strongest im-
mediate effects on sovereign bond spreads across the euro area, including some of the core
countries. The effect of the SMP has also been shown to have limited the contagion be-
tween euro area sovereigns. The OMT announcements had a smaller immediate impact in
some of the periphery countries. In this case, the effects propagated to sovereign spreads
through a longer time period due to the relatively vague nature of the announcements.
As had been expected, the most recent PSPP adopted by the ECB had no significant
immediate impacts on sovereign bond spreads in the euro area. However, there might
be a second-order effect from the PSPP on the spreads due to investors’ search for yield.
Finally, the CBPP’s and the ABSPP were targeted at other markets and were not found
to have immediately affected sovereign bond spreads.
The differences in the magnitude of the effects on spreads were due to the very different
features of the programmes. The SMP was a large programme in the sense that no ex ante
commitments on purchase volumes were made. Moreover, it was very clearly communi-
cated to be implemented straight away34 and in a way that targeted particularly sovereign
bonds of distressed euro area countries. The OMT programme was large as well as it
was set up with the potential to purchase unlimited amounts of sovereign bonds. Fur-
thermore, given the conditionality element of the OMT, purchases were clearly targeted
towards sovereign bonds of distressed euro area countries. As effective as this communica-
tion eventually turned out to be, immediate effects on spreads were smaller than through
the SMP, due to a lack of clear commitments. As the PSPP is not targeted particularly
at distressed euro area sovereigns, it was already expected that it would not immediately
impact spreads. These findings are thus in line with the theory-based expectations.
On a methodological note, the increasingly popular event study approach to the evaluation
of central banks’ asset purchases proved to be useful. In this respect, the contribution of
this paper was to carefully select a GARCH model specification that has been shown to be
robust to sensitivity tests from a variety of different angles. However, several shortcom-
ings of this approach have been identified. On the one hand, the event study framework
does not allow to reliably extract effects that go beyond a 1 to 3-day event window. On
the other hand, the GARCH specification was not very robust to changes in the number
34For both SMP announcements on 10 May 2010 and on 7 August 2011, the implementation followed
within one day after the announcement.
27
of ARCH terms. The effects of the asset purchases of the ECB found in this paper are
smaller in magnitude than in the empirical literature. Moreover, the effects vanish when
including the additional ARCH term. Therefore, immediate effects found in the previous
literature might, on average, be overstated. Finally, with a dataset that covers a large
time period with market regime changes, subsample analysis might yield more reliable
results. However, this analysis is methodologically difficult as the regime changes might
in fact be triggered by the asset purchase programmes themselves.
Apart from these general limitations of the metholodigcal approach used in this paper,
there are some specific limitations that should be taken into account by future research.
The endogeneity of the daily purchases during the SMP programme could not be elimi-
nated to a large extent. This was due to the fact that the necessary data was unavailable.
Thus, the finding that there were no significant effects from the daily purchases of the SMP
on sovereign spreads has to be taken with caution. Moreover, the use of more granular
data (i.e. country-by-country data on both the controls and the asset purchases) could
yield even more robust results. Finally, the approach of this paper could well be used for
a counterfactual analysis.
Overall, the findings of this paper have policy implications for central banks and the
ECB, in particular. When designing an asset purchase programme to combat increasing
sovereign bond spreads, three criteria should be met to maximize the impact of the pro-
gramme. Firstly, risky sovereigns should be targeted specifically in line with their relative
default, redenomination and liquidity risks. Secondly, the programme should be large
enough to move the market. In practice, no ex ante commitment on purchase volumes
might be most effective in this respect. Finally, the programme should be clearly com-
municated to allow market participants to price in the decrease in the relative risk of the
distressed sovereigns. Considering what is at stake in financial market crisis situations,
having a clear recipe such as this might very well prevent a breakup of the euro area.
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